Nuclear disarmament and international law

In theory, both the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the 2017 Nuclear Ban Treaty aim to advance nuclear disarmament.

But in practice, the core ‘pillar’ at the centre of the Nonproliferation Treaty is nuclear deterrence, which means maintaining nuclear threats, not getting rid of them.

The nuclear armed states and their allies who support the Nonproliferation Treaty claim that making nuclear threats is “the supreme guarantee” of national security, “guarantees protection of national sovereignty and territorial integrity”, and contributes to international peace. They also claim that modernising and expanding their nuclear arsenals is compatible with their obligation under the Nonproliferation Treaty to pursue negotiations in good faith for disarmament.

In contrast, the members of the Nuclear Ban Treaty have unanimously stated that nuclear deterrence is a threat that undermines nonproliferation and human and national security, and prevents progress on disarmament.

These distinctions are not academic – they have very real human and planetary consequences. Humanity is now facing a new, multipolar nuclear arms. The risk factors that could trigger a nuclear war are expanding in number and type. And recent scholarship has proved that on multiple occasions, it was pure luck, not nuclear deterrence, that prevented the launch of nuclear weapons and probably, nuclear war.

We urgently need global cooperation to advance nuclear disarmament and reduce nuclear risks - and that means confronting the anti-scientific theories underlying the practice of nuclear, and the legal fantasies that nuclear armed states and their allies promote within the Nonproliferation Treaty.